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violated Article 10 
 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh 
 
The European Court’s Fifth Section has unanimously held that a damages award made against 
an Irish newspaper for defamation violated the right to freedom of expression, under Article 
10 of the European Convention. While the judgment in Independent Newspapers v. Ireland 
concerned Irish defamation law prior to reforms brought about in 2009, it is still significant 
for signalling to Irish courts that unpredictably high damages have a “chilling effect,” and 
require the “most careful scrutiny” and “very strong justification.”  
 
The case arose in November 2004, when the Evening Herald published a number of articles 
concerning a consultant working for an Irish government ministry. While the articles had 
raised issues over the awarding of certain government contracts, the articles also referred to 
“rumours of an intimate relationship” between the married consultant and a government 
minister. The consultant sued for defamation, and a High Court jury found the articles were 
defamatory, having “alleged an extra-marital affair.” The jury awarded 1,872,000 euro in 
damages to the consultant. However, in 2014, the Supreme Court allowed an appeal over the 
amount of damages, holding that it was “so disproportionate to the injury suffered and wrong 
done that no reasonable jury would have made such an award.” Instead, the Supreme Court 
substituted a sum of 1,250,000 euro in damages (here). 
 
The newspaper’s publisher made an application to the European Court, claiming the damages 
award was excessive, and “signified the absence of adequate and effective safeguards” in Irish 
defamation law, in violation of Article 10’s guarantee of freedom of expression. Moreover, 
representative associations of national and regional newspapers (NewsBrands Ireland and 
Local Ireland) also made third-party submissions, arguing that Irish defamation law had a 
chilling effect on newspapers, leading to a “marked reluctance to publish stories of grave 
public interest for fear of very high awards of compensation.”  
 
The first issue raised by the applicant was that Irish law on defamation damages was not 
sufficiently clear, and violated Article 10’s “prescribed by law” clause. The applicant pointed 
out that the High Court judge “was not permitted to offer any useful or meaningful guidance 
to the jury, such as relevant comparisons or even a range of figures.” However, the Court 
rejected the argument, and applied the principle from the Court’s 1995 judgment in Tolstoy 
Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, that “the absence of specific guidelines in the legal rules 
governing the assessment of damages must be seen as an inherent feature of the law of 
damages” in defamation, and did not violate Article 10.  
 
The Court then moved on to consider whether the damages award satisfied the proportionality 
requirement under Article 10, and stated it would examine the “adequacy and efficacy” of the 
“domestic safeguards against disproportionate awards.”  The Court also noted that it was 
proceeding on the basis that it was an “established fact” the articles were defamatory. As a 
preliminary matter, the Court held that the “unusual size” of the awards, even by “domestic 
standards,” at both High Court and Supreme Court level, was enough “to trigger” the Court’s 
review. The Court then examined the High Court and Supreme Court awards in detail. 
 
 
In relation the High Court, the Court noted that the judge had provided some guidance to the 
jury on how to assess damages, such as the “nature of the libel.” However, the Court noted 
that in relation to the “quantum of damages,” the judge said “he was not permitted to give any 
such guideline,” or “any figure or range of figures.” The Court held that the judge’s directions 
“remained inevitably quite generic,” and “caused him both frustration and regret.” The Court 
concluded that the judge’s direction was not “such as to reliably guide the jury towards an 
assessment of damages” that was proportionate.  
 
The Court then turned to the Supreme Court’s decision. It noted that the Supreme Court had 
found the jury award disproportionate, and it followed, that in setting aside the jury award, 
“the appellate safeguard was effective.” However, the Court said that Article 10 analysis did 
not end there, and as the Supreme Court had substituted its own award of damages, the Court 
was required to examine “the process for arriving at that award.” As the Supreme Court award 
was “higher than any award ever made by a jury or appellate court,” the European Court held 
that “very strong justification would be required for such a heavy sanction.” However, the 
Court would not “second guess the final award”, but examine whether the “process followed” 
disclosed “relevant and sufficient reasons supporting the conclusion finally reached.”  
 
The Court noted that the Supreme Court’s judgment “does not provide an explanation for the 
final award,” and “did not explain,” apart from reference to principles which had been put to 
the jury in the High Court, “how it arrived at the figure of EUR 1.25 million.” The Court 
stated that while jury assessment of damages “may be inherently complex and uncertain”, 
judicial control at appellate level “should, through the statement of reasons for the award, 
reduce uncertainty to the extent possible.” The Court held that “clarification was lacking 
regarding why, in particular, the highest ever award was required in a case which the Supreme 
Court did not categorise as one of the gravest and most serious libels.” Crucially, the Court 
held that given the “exceptional nature” of the damages award, this “pointed to a need for 
comprehensive reasons explaining the final award.” This was particularly so given that the 
award “had the capacity to act as a benchmark for future defamation awards and out-of-court 
settlement.” Thus, the Court found that the Supreme Court had failed to provide “very strong 
justification” for its award, and thus violated Article 10’s guarantee of freedom of expression.  
 
Comment  
 
First, while the Court did find a violation of Article 10, it acknowledged that the case was 
“conducted under a legal regime that has since changed,” with Ireland’s Defamation Act 
2009, including new provisions on assessment of damages (here). The Court noted the 
Supreme Court’s holding that “it is now possible for the trial judge to give more detailed 
directions to a jury as to the assessment of damages,” and the European Court said it 
“welcomes the Supreme Court’s indication regarding the development of domestic practice 
towards the provision of more detailed guidance to the jury.” Notably, the Irish government is 
currently reviewing the operation of the Defamation Act 2009 (here), and it is hoped 
Independent Newspapers and its principles will be incorporated into the review. 
 
However, it is worth reiterating that not only was the jury direction deficient, it was the 
Supreme Court’s lack of adequate reasoning for coming to the figure of 1,250,000 euro, 
which also violated Article 10. Irish judges not adequately explaining how defamation awards 
are calculated still arguably persists, even after the Defamation Act 2009. Only last month, the 
Irish Court of Appeal (here) set aside a 140,000 euro damages award made against a 
broadcaster by a High Court judge, and not a jury (here), and drastically cut the award to 
36,000 euro. While this demonstrates “appellate review” working, Irish media are still being 
required to initiate costly appeals to ensure “proportionate” awards.  
 
Finally, although the applicant did not explicitly argue that juries determining the amount of 
defamation damages violates Article 10, it is notable that the Court seemed to go out of its 
way to indicate its view on the role of juries. In its concluding remarks, the Court stressed that 
it is “mindful,” of Ireland’s “attachment to the institution of the jury in defamation cases”, and 
held it was “entirely legitimate to involve citizens in different aspects of the administration of 
justice” (citing Taxquet v. Belgium). Moreover, the Court noted the role of juries had been 
“reaffirmed” in the 2009 Act, “following careful reflection and debate at domestic level.” 
Thus, such language would suggest the continued use of juries in defamation proceedings, 
even in the calculation of damages, is still consistent with the European Convention.   
 
 
